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Hence it is no longer as certain as it was that there is no middle stage between 
presence and absence. ... It is false to say that the screen is incapable of putting 
us 'in the presence of' the actor. It does so in the same way as a mirror - one 
must agree that the mirror relays the presence of the person reflected in it – but 
it is a mirror with a delayed reflection, the tin foil of which retains the image. It 
is true that in the theatre Molière can die on the stage and that we have the 
privilege of living in the biographical time of the actor. In the film about 
Manolete however we are present at the actual death of the famous matador 
and while our emotion may not be as deep as if we were actually present in the 
arena at that historic moment, its nature is the same. 
 
Andre Bazin [1951]1 
 
The cinema is a language which expresses reality with reality. So the question is: 
What is the difference between the cinema and reality? Practically none. 
 
Pier Paolo Pasolini [?]2 
 
Psychological evidence strongly supports the contention that we learn to 
recognize what a picture stands for as soon as we have become able to 
recognize the objects, or kinds of objects, that serve as the models for that 
picture.  Picture recognition is not a skill acquired over and above object 
recognition.  Whatever features or cues we come to employ in object 
recognition, we also mobilize to recognize what pictures depict.  A child raised 
without pictorial representations will, after being shown a couple of pictures, be 
able to identify the referent of any standard picture of a kind of object with 
which he or she is familiar.  The rapid development of this picture-recognition 
capacity contrasts strongly with the acquisition of a symbol system such as a 
language. 
 
J. E. Hochberg and V. Brooks [1962] 3  
                                                     
1 Andre Bazin, "Theater and Cinema – Part II", pages 95-124 of What is Cinema? 
(Volume I), essays selected and translated by Hugh Grey (Berkeley: the University of California 
Press, 1967), pages 97 and 98. 
2 Quoted in Oswald Stack's Pasolini on Pasolini (London: Thames & Hudson, 1969), 
page 29. 
3 From J. E. Hochberg and V. Brooks, "Pictorial Recognition as an Unlearned Ability", 
American Journal of Psychology, no. 75 (1962), pages 624-628. [Paragraph as quoted by Noël 
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Pictures have a double reality. Drawings, paintings and photographs are objects 
in their own right patterns on a flat sheet and at the same time entirely 
different objects to the eye. We see both a pattern of marks on paper, with 
shading, brush-strokes or photographic 'grain', and at the same time we see the 
these compose a face, a house or a ship on a stormy sea. Pictures are unique 
among objects; for they are seen both as themselves and as some other things, 
entirely different from the paper or canvas of the picture. Pictures are 
paradoxes. … No object can be in two places at the same time; no object can lie in 
two- and three-dimensional space. Yet pictures are both visibly flat and three-
dimensional. They are a certain size, yet also the size of a face of a house or a ship. 
Pictures are impossible. 
 
Richard Gregory [1970]4  
 
Yet this seems, ontologically, to be what is happening when we look at a 
photograph: we see things that are not present. … Someone will object: "That is 
playing with words. We're not seeing something not present; we are looking at 
something perfectly present, namely, a photograph." But that is affirming 
something I have not denied. On the contrary, I am precisely describing, or 
wishing to describe, what it means to say that there is this photograph here. It 
may be felt that I make too great a mystery of these objects. My feeling is rather 
that we have forgotten how mysterious these things are, and in general how 
different things are from one another, as though we had forgotten how to value 
them. This is in fact something movies teach us. 
 
Stanley Cavell [1971]5 
 
 
Prologue 
 
I begin with a puzzle from the history of philosophy followed by another from the 
history of filmmaking and its theories. The conundra appear unconnected. Upon 
examination, however, they will prove to encompass a common confusion about 
identity claims, and the solution to the first will provide the clue to the solution of the 
second. 
                                                     
Carroll, Mystifying Movies: Fads & Fallacies in Contemporary Film Theory (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1988), page 139.] 
4 Richard Gregory, The Intelligent Eye (London: George Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), 
page 32. 
5 Stanley Cavell, The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film (New York: the 
Viking Press, 1971), pages 18 and 19. 
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As we shall see, the histories of philosophy and film theory are littered with the debris 
left by those who have thought incautiously about identity. Identity is a tough topic, of 
course, requiring for penetration both more care and more audacity than philosophers 
have heretofore given to it. If I am correct, then we must radically realign our logical and 
epistemological sensitivities to get it right, for I suspect that most of the unresolved 
problems of philosophy rest at root upon incompatible identity claims – and identity 
claims, as we shall see, are immune to refutation. 
 
Small wonder, then, that the classical problems of philosophy resist solution. Small 
wonder, as well, that the core problem of classical film theory remains unresolved. 
That's what confusion is all about. Let's see how and why. 
 
 
A Puzzle from the History of Philosophy 
 
In 1787 Kant published the second edition of his first 'critique', the Kritic der reinen 
Vernunft, that had appeared six years earlier in 1781. Kant was to write other books 
following his long silence of the 1770s, all of them important and most of them 
controversial, but this was the only one that he reissued in a revised edition. 
 
Why did Kant believe that a revised edition might be useful? He insisted within it that he 
had changed his mind about nothing essential and indeed represented the bulk of the 
book unaltered. He rewrote the Deduction and the section on the Paralogisms, however 
and then added a major Preface that bore little resemblance to the original, for within it 
he addressed directly the fundamental misconception by many of his critics of the 
identity upon which his entire work rested. 
  
What had Kant said originally? and what had his critics mistakenly construed him to 
have said? Thankfully, we need not probe deeply into Kantian exegesis, for the error 
was glaring, and one would be hard-pressed to find a clearer example of identities 
confused and the lessons to be learned therefrom 
 
Kant fundamental notion was simple and can be simply exemplified. When we 
encounter a book, we may encounter the front, the back or one of its sides or perhaps 
the top or pages 4 and 5 of the interior. While doing so, however, we never see 
simultaneously its front, back, sides and the tops of pages 4, 5, 23 and 24. Why not? 
Because, as Kant said, we are constrained spatially. But we are not only constrained 
spatially, for we also see the book as it is but never as it was or will be. Why not? 
Because, again as Kant said, we are constrained temporally as well. Space and time, in 
Kant's phrase, were thus forms of intuition constraining not only how objects appear to 
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us but also how they fit within the categories, such as causality, by which we think of 
them. 
 
We need only ponder the example of the book, however, to realise, as Kant did, that we 
can think of a being who, unlike ourselves, would be unconstrained spatially and 
temporally. Such a being (Kant's 'God'), unimaginable but thinkable, would encounter 
the same book that we do but would do so by registering its front, back, side, top, 
interior, exterior, past, present and future within a single encounter. Such a being, that 
is, would encounter the very same objects and events that we encounter within our 
world, but, being unconstrained spatially and temporally (and hence unconstrained 
causally as well), it would encounter them differently. 
 
The singleness of the world and its objects, however differently encounterable, lay at 
the core of Kant's account within the first edition of his first Kritik, and obviously so, or 
so he must have thought when writing of it. But what happened to it? Many readers of 
the first edition, caught up in complexities, reasoned as follows:6 the book-as-it-appears-
to-us is spatial, temporal and causal, whereas the book-as-it-is-in-itself (that is, the book 
as it would be encountered by a being unconstrained as we are) would be nonspatial, 
nontemporal and noncausal. The first book must therefore be distinct from the second, 
for it has different properties. The world as encountered by us – the  phenomenal world 
– must therefore be a different world from the one encountered by the unconstrained 
being – the noumenal world. Thus, they argued, Kant's ontology encompasses two 
distinct worlds having no possible coherent interrelationship between them. (It couldn't 
be a causal relationship, for example, for only the phenomenal world has causes.) Kant's 
epistemology is therefore incoherent at its core. 
 
But Kant, unlike his critics, had used no hyphens! He had never spoken of a book-as-it-
appears versus a book-as-it-is-in-itself. Rather, he had spoken of a single object – a book 
– encounterable in diverse ways: a book as encountered spatially, temporally and 
causally by us in contrast to the same book as it would be encountered nonspatially, 
nontemporally and noncausally by a being unconstrained as we are.  
 
In the Preface to the second edition, Kant made his point transparently clear: he was 
speaking of a single book, differently encounterable, rather than two. 
 
... we can therefore have no knowledge of any object as thing in itself, but only 
in so far as it is an object of sensible intuition, that is, an appearance ... the 
distinction, which our Critique has shown to be necessary [is] between things as 
objects of experience and those same things as things in themselves ... the 
object is to be taken in a twofold sense, namely as appearance and as thing in 
                                                     
6 Here, as before, I use an imaginary sighting of a 'book' as exemplary. 
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itself ... the principle of causality therefore applies only to things taken in the 
former sense, namely, in so far as they are objects of experience – these same 
objects, taken in the other sense, not being subject to the principle ... (Bxxvi and 
Bxxvii).  
 
Why, then, has the confusion persisted to this day? Kant had implied in the first edition, 
as he reaffirmed explicitly in his preface to the second edition, that the things that we 
can encounter only as they 'appear' are the same things that God can encounter as they 
are 'in themselves'! The book that I encounter on my desktop as it 'appears' is the same 
book that God encounters as it is 'in itself', even though we encounter it differently. As 
Kant put it, the book is encounterable 'in a two-fold sense': we, constrained as we are, 
must encounter it as it 'appears' spatially, temporally and causally; God, on the other 
hand, can encounter it as it is 'in itself' free of the spatially, temporal and causal 
constraints that restrict us.  
 
Kant was claiming that we must encounter the book differently than God does. Kant's 
critics, on the other hand, were insisting that if we must encounter the book as spatial, 
temporal and causal whereas the book as encountered by God is otherwise, we and God 
must be encountering different books rather than the same book differently.  
 
Who was right? Kant! – and the methodological moral deserves attention. 
  
Having made an identity claim, Kant was construing differences adverbially. We and God 
are encountering the same book differently, as evident by our use of different adverbs 
when describing how differently we encounter it. Kant's critics, denying the identity, 
were construing them adjectivally. We and God are encountering different books, or so 
they supposed, as evident by the use of different adjectives when describing their 
distinct attributes.  
 
Both positions were coherent; each could be maintained come what may. But hidden 
within the dispute was an epistemological implication of enormous methodological 
significance not only for understanding the resistance to refutation of Kant's position 
but also for understanding the persistent wrangling among film theorists over the 
ontology of the cinematic image.  
 
If a claimant is willing to construe all differences 
adverbially, identity claims are irrefutable. 
 
Before unpacking this suggestion further, let's anchor our discussion within the context 
of how we see events by means of movies and photographs. 
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A Puzzle from the History of Filmmaking 
 
In 1895 Louis Lumière stood on a quay in the railway station at La Ciotat in southern 
France awaiting the arrival of a train. Beside him stood a curious machine that he had 
constructed, one of the first motion picture cameras. As the train pulled into the station, 
Lumière aimed his camera and turned the crank. The train rolled to a stop and the 
passengers disembarked, walking past the camera and into the depot. Finally, having 
exhausted his reel of film, Lumière stopped cranking the camera. 
 
Several months later, on 28 December 1895, thirty-five persons gathered in the Salon 
Indien in the basement of the Grand Café on the Boulevard des Capucines in Paris 
having purchased tickets to the first paid public screenings in a 'cinema'. During the 
evening a roll of film printed from the strip exposed at the train station was placed 
inside the machine now converted into a projector. The lights were dimmed, the 
projector's lamp was lit, the spectators gazed at a screen hung at the end of the room 
and the projectionist began to crank the projector. 
 
Let's pause to ponder a key question, namely what did the members of the audience see 
as they peered subsequently at the screen in the darkened room? Or, more precisely,  
 
What kinds of objects did they encounter visually as they focused their eyes 
upon the variably illuminated screen hanging before them?7 
 
Many in the audience that evening were no doubt friends or acquaintances of Lumière, 
technically aware of the process and eager to witness the results. They knew that one of 
the things they were encountering was the surface of the screen hanging before them, 
variably illuminated by the focused flashes of light being emitted intermittently by the 
projector. No serious thinker known to me has ever disagreed.  
 
From eyewitness accounts, however, we know that the members of the audience 
thought they were encountering at exactly the same time objects of another kind as 
well, namely a train pulling into the station and passengers disembarking, walking from 
the train and exiting the quay – the same train, station, passengers and quay that 
Lumière had encountered some months before. 
                                                     
7 Throughout this book, I shall use the word 'encounter' as a precise equivalent to Kant's 
'Anschauung', a term usually translated into English, with appropriate misgivings, as 'intuition'. 
The comprehension of Kant by students, and by many scholars as well, would be immeasurably 
advanced were the noun 'intuition' and the verb 'to intuit' to be banned from all translations 
and the words 'encounter' and 'to encounter' put in their place. 
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The members of Lumière's audience a century ago were making an assumption that has 
guided ever after the thinking of every powerful filmmaker and every thinker who has 
influenced the course of filmmaking: by means of a film we may encounter objects and 
events that are not only of common kind to those encountered in the world about us, 
but sometimes, as in Lumière's case, identical to them. 
 
Remarkably, however, many commentators about filmmaking and its theories, indeed 
most, have disagreed with them! Most commentators known to me have implied that 
the members of Lumière's audience could never have seen the train, the station, 
passengers disembarking or the quay by means of his film. Rather, they must have been 
seeing something else – something peculiar and peculiarly illusory.  
 
Different words have been used by commentators to describe what was seen.8 Indeed, 
the history of film theory has been largely a battle waged over what word would best 
complete the following sentence: 
 
The people in the Lumières' audience saw a    ___     of the train pulling into the 
station. 
 
Some have argued that the word 'photograph' or 'movie' or 'film' ought to be inserted; 
others have recommended the word 'image'; still others 'representation', 'presentation', 
'reproduction', 'picture', 'depiction', 'model', 'signifier', even 'imaginary signifier' or 
'illusion'. And all, with the inconsistent exceptions of André Bazin and Siegfried Kracauer 
(and perhaps later Cavell, and more recently Scruton and Walton),9 have agreed that the 
following sentence must be untenable: 
                                                     
8 Throughout this chapter I shall refrain from naming film theorists guilty of the 
transgressions I impute to members of their class or citing samples of their logic-free arguments. 
Incautious readers might therefore assume that I am in danger of flailing at windmills. 
Thankfully, however, as the literature of film theory everywhere attests, the broad positions 
that I attack are so prevalent that readers may be left free to choose their own best examples. 
To do more would be to draw attention to the genesis of the confusion rather than its logic, and 
that should be the subject of an historical and thus distinct investigation. 
9 Andre Bazin's ontological conjectures are scattered throughout the essays 
encompassed in What is Cinema? (Volume I) selected and translated by Hugh Grey (Berkeley: 
the University of California Press, 1967); and Siegfried Kracauer's may be found in his Theory of 
Film: the Redemption of Physical Reality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1965). Stanley 
Cavell's clearest account to date occurs in The World Viewed: Reflections on the Ontology of Film 
(original edition: New York: the Viking Press, 1971); Roger Scruton's in "Photography and 
Representation", Critical Inquiry, Volume 7, 1981, pages 577-603; and Kendall Walton's in 
"Transparent Pictures: On the Nature of Photographic Realism", Critical Inquiry, Volume 11, 
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The people in the Lumières' audience saw the train pulling into the station. 
 
Puzzling, isn't it? For, by all accounts, that is what the members of the audience thought 
they saw. 
 
The puzzle deepens when generalized. Humans have been viewing motion pictures for 
over a century and reacting as if they were thereby able to encounter objects and 
events occurring in places other than the room in which the screenings were taking 
place. Concurrently, filmmakers have asked themselves questions of epistemological 
significance, namely how ought movies to be written, designed, shot, directed, edited 
and projected to enable audiences to best comprehend the events seen thereby? 
 
At the same time, however, most film theorists have denied the presumption, obsessed 
with an ontological question. 
 
When humans encounter a cinematic event, what kind of event could it be?  
 
Most theorists, unable theoretically to believe their own eyes, have presupposed that 
ontology must be logically prior to epistemology. They have presumed, it seems, that 
until one has decided what kind of events cinematical or photographical events are, one 
cannot ask the epistemological questions precisely, for such questions, as commonly 
put, presuppose that humans can see by means of movies or photographs what humans 
have uniformly thought they were seeing (dogs and cats, trees and flowers, bloodied 
faces, tearful eyes, etc.).  
 
The result? For over a century, as filmmakers have fashioned powerful movies, film 
theory has degenerated into a trivial pursuit.10 Why? What in particular has sustained 
the recurring debate among film theorists since 1895 concerning the ontological status 
of the cinematic event? What conceptual error has rendered it unresolvable? for clearly 
an intellectual controversy must rest upon a deep-rooted confusion to have persisted 
for so long unresolved. 
 
The general answer, I suggest, is that most film theorists have failed to comprehend one 
of the cardinal lessons of 20th-century philosophy, namely, that  
                                                     
1984, pages 246-277 and "Looking Again Through Photographs: A Response to Edwin Martin", 
Critical Inquiry, Volume 12, 1986, pages 801-808. 
10 I speak politely. Others (obviously non-Canadian) have been blunt. As Alexander 
Sesonske recently put it, "contemporary film theory is an intellectual disaster." (The Journal of 
Aesthetics & Art Criticism, Volume 47, Number 3: Summer, 1989; page 285.) 
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Epistemological questions are epistemologically prior to ontological ones.  
 
One must begin with the best-tested beliefs of which we are aware (epistemology) and 
only then inquire as to what kind of objects must exist if they are true (ontology).11 Our 
ontologies must be inferred from our epistemologies rather than the reverse.  
 
Had this lesson been learned by film theorists, much waste would have been avoided 
(including the rampant confusions of the "realist-formalist" controversy deriving from 
this ontological bias; see note 13 below). The lesson has resisted learning, however, for 
it comes shrouded in exactly the same confusion that misled the critics of Kant – a 
misconstrual of the logic of identity. 
 
Let's focus our attention upon it by means of a thought-experiment centred for 
simplicity upon how we see things by means of photographs. 
   
 
A Thought-Experiment 
 
I walk into a large room within the main house of a Canadian country estate. On the 
walls are hanging photographs of relatives and friends of the family, among them one of 
an elderly gentlemen scowling crossly at the photographer.12 
 
A ten-year-old girl enters the room, introducing herself as the daughter of the couple 
who own the house. After exchanging pleasantries, I point to the photograph of the old 
man and ask if she knows who he is? "That's my Grandpa", she replies. When I suggest 
that he looks annoyed and must have been quite old at the time, she nods, adding that 
her mother says that he never liked having his photograph taken, and the photographer 
had surprised him. "The picture was taken at his last birthday party", she says, adding 
after a pause, " I never met him. He died before I was born." 
 
The above conversation is common enough. The young girl responds naturally to my 
questions, each of us assuming that, by means of the photograph, we are able to see 
                                                     
11 Willard Quine in particular has spent much of his life teaching this lesson. For quick 
immersion see the key essays in From a Logical Point of View (2nd revised edition published in 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1961) and in Ontological Relativity & Other Essays (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1969). 
12 I shall for clarity speak here of photographs rather than movies or videotapes. The 
transition from a photographic example more simply described to cinematic cases complicated 
by motion will be transparent, for the logic of the argument are identical. 
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her grandfather as he stood in a room, glaring at a photographer during a birthday party 
more than a decade ago. 
  
As noted above, of course, many serious thinkers have denied the assumption. But what 
if the young girl means what she says, has a fund of logical wit and is unintimidated by 
the weight of critical tradition? What if, that is, she believes the following? 
 
A. The world within which she lives, moves and has her being has 
encompassed two objects, albeit for the most part non-concurrently. 
 
1. Her grandfather (a human being, now deceased, 
who weighed scarcely sixty kilograms on his last birthday, 
stood one-hundred-and-seventy centimetres tall, was of 
mild complexion and generally foul temper, etc.); and 
 
2.  The photograph of her grandfather now hanging on 
the wall (a black-and-white rectangular object, twenty-
eight by thirty-six centimetres, garishly framed, weighing 
perhaps five-hundres grams, etc.). 
 
B. Her grandfather and the photograph of him are different objects.  
 
[Keep B in mind as you read the reminder of this essay, for 
its presence as a premise reduces to nonsense the 
commonplace insistence of commentators that viewers 
who claim to see by means of a photograph the object 
photographed, as our young girl does, must somehow be 
conflating the photograph with the object.] 
 
C. When looking at the photograph of her grandfather, she sees the 
photograph of her grandfather..  
 
D. When looking at the photograph of her grandfather, however, she 
thereby sees her grandfather as well. 
 
Our young girl is affirming, in other words, that by seeing the photograph of her 
grandfather, she can see an object, her grandfather, distinct from the photograph by 
which she sees him. By seeing the photograph of grandfather, she is able by the same 
act of perception to see her grandfather as he stood a dozen years ago in a room within 
which his last birthday was being celebrated. 
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Note carefully! The young girl is claiming that she can see, by means of a photograph 
hanging on a wall in a room within which she is standing, her grandfather as he stood 
within a different room at a different time – the room and time within which his last 
birthday party was occurring. The photograph and her grandfather are distinct objects 
(remember B above?), and only the photograph is hanging before her in the room 
within which she stands. By looking at the photograph, however, she sees her 
grandfather in another time and place. She has never been in the same room with him. 
Indeed, she has never met the man. She's only seen him by means of his photograph. 
 
Logically speaking, the young girl is affirming an identity.  
 
She is claiming to see something when looking at the photograph of her 
grandfather, distinct from the photograph, that she would otherwise have never 
been able to see, and is identifying this other object that she sees with her 
grandfather. 
 
Her claim, carefully considered, is fascinating, for it is immune not only from the 
classical counterarguments of critics but from counterarguments altogether – as are all 
identity claims, carefully considered. 
 
Let's look in passing at the failure of the classical counterarguments then in detail at the 
peculiar epistemological status of identity claims. 
 
 
The Failure of Counterarguments 
 
The young girl has affirmed that, by means of a photograph, she can see an object in the 
world distinct from the photograph.13 Many writers on film and photography, unable to 
believe their eyes, have rested their counterarguments on the simple suggestion, 
believed mistakenly to be validated by common sense, that to see a photograph of one's 
dead grandfather precludes seeing one's grandfather simultaneously, failing to notice 
that the premise does not entail the conclusion. 
 
                                                     
13 Many film theorists, especially those fond of distinguishing 'realists' from others (from 
'formalists', for example), would presume that our young girl is thereby making a 'realistic' 
claim. Her claim would be 'realistic', however, only if she believed that the objects she had seen 
and identified were 'real'. If, on the contrary, she, like Berkeley, were to construe them as 
'ideal', then her claim would be 'idealistic' rather than 'realistic'. Her claim, in short, is neutral 
with respect to the dominant distinctions of contemporary film theory (ontologically biased one-
and-all). 
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Some writers, of course, have attempted to evade the logical gap. They have proceeded 
in one of three ways. 
 
By arguing that since grandfathers have different properties than photographs of 
grandfathers, seeing the latter precludes thereby seeing the former;  
 
By arguing that since grandfathers are different causal agents than photographs 
of grandfathers, the effects caused by them (that is, seeing grandfather) could 
never be identical; or  
 
By arguing that since photographs of grandfathers may cause us to misidentify 
the grandfathers seen thereby, we ought never to identify the grandfathers seen 
by means of photographs with the grandfathers. 
 
I shall refer to the first as Arguments from Diverse Stimuli, to the second as Arguments 
from Diverse Causes and to the third as Arguments from Mistaken Identity. All are 
invalid. Let's see how. 
 
 
Arguments from Diverse Stimuli: 
 
How often writers point out that photographs are often black-and-white, two-
dimensional, subject to shape distortions due to lens aberrations, perceptually grainy, 
etc., whereas the objects photographed, if otherwise seen, would be fully coloured, 
three-dimensional, non-distorted and without grain, concluding that we ought never to 
identify the objects seen by means of photographs with the objects photographed! 
 
The argument, generalized, is that registering diverse visual stimuli must entail seeing 
diverse objects. (Or, conversely put, that identity of visual stimuli is a prerequisite for 
identification of the objects seen.) The argument is invalid, of course, and trivially so. 
Were identity of visual stimuli required before identifying objects seen, we should never 
have been able to identify anything we have seen: 
 
a.  I glance at the tree in my front yard, turn away and then glance again at the 
tree. The stimuli received during the second glance are diverse, if only temporally, 
from those received during the first glance, yet I see the same tree with the second 
glance as with the first. 
 
b.  I look at the tree as I leave the house in the morning and do so again as I 
return in the evening. The stimuli received are different, but the tree is the same. 
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c.  I cover my left eye with a patch and thus see the tree two-dimensionally 
rather than three-dimensionally. But I see the same tree differently rather than a 
different tree. 
 
d. I put on dark glasses. I see the same tree darkly rather than a different tree.  
 
 
Were identity of stimuli required for identification of objects seen, I should never have 
seen the same tree on any of the above occasions. Indeed, I should never have been 
able to identify anything that I have seen. Such a construal of the world may be logically 
coherent but hardly pragmatically feasible, for identification of objects is a prerequisite 
of perceiving any world at all – as Kant would have insisted.   
 
Under what conditions do we identify objects in the world? We identify objects seen 
through dark glasses, tinted windows, damaged eyes, different eyes, different stimuli, 
by different persons, through microscopes and telescopes, etc.. None of these preclude 
our identifying of the objects seen. 
  
But we needn't multiply examples, for the moral is clear. One may assuredly impose 
criteria of identity upon objects seen by means of photographs or movies, but can never 
on pain of nonsense impose criteria that would render impossible identification of 
objects as ordinarily seen in the world! Obviously, identity of stimuli is too strong a 
criterion.14 
 
When viewing the photograph of her grandfather, our young girl is indeed seeing her 
grandfather as constrained by the properties of the photograph. She sees her 
grandfather black-and-whitely, two-dimensionally, grainily, and perhaps subject to 
distortions of shape. She never, however, sees a black-and-white, two-dimensional, 
grainy, or distorted grandfather, just as seeing him darkly through dark glasses would 
never entail that he has suddenly become darker than he is! How she sees her 
grandfather is constrained by the properties of the photograph, but the properties of 
the photograph are never properties of what she sees (that is, her grandfather). 
 
As noted above, this is the same confusion of adverbs with adjectives that plagued the 
critics of Kant, and as shall be pointed out below, no diversity of received stimuli could 
                                                     
14 Much of a movie's value depends often upon the non-identity of the stimuli received 
when viewing objects by means of it rather than viewing the objects directly. When a scientist 
views a film of an event taken in slow-motion, for example, she identifies what she sees by 
means of film with the event that was photographed as it happened in the world. But it is 
precisely the ability of the film to transmit stimuli that differ from those that she could have 
received if viewing the event directly that renders the exercise valuable. 
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ever be sufficient to entail non-identity of objects seen. But we have said enough to 
render the Arguments from Diverse Stimuli impotent.  
 
 
Arguments from Diverse Causes: 
 
As our young girl has affirmed (premise (B)) that her grandfather is distinct from his 
photograph. He is a different object and has therefore assuredly caused some different 
effects. 
 
The arguments from diverse causes, however, conclude that our young girl could never 
have seen her grandfather by seeing his photograph, for the effect of seeing her 
grandfather could only have been caused by looking at him, never by looking at his 
photograph. He is an object, the photograph another, and the difference entails the 
non-identity of the effects they have caused. 
 
The arguments come nuanced in diverse ways. Some authors stress that the objects 
seen by means of photographs and movies have been conditioned by different choices 
than those that condition events otherwise seen (choices of camera positioning by 
directors, cinematographers, or photographers; choices of lenses by the same; choices 
of location by producers or directors; etc.). Many point out that the events that cause us 
to see things by means of movies or photographs (frames of celluloid intermittently 
projected, for example, or emulsions distributed across sheets of paper; etc.) are 
distinct from the events that would have enabled to see those things directly. Hence, 
they conclude, since the causes are different, the effects must be different, and thus we 
cannot be seeing by means of movies or photographs the things we claim to see. 
  
The arguments, once again, are one and all invalid, for counterexamples abound.  
 
I am thrice driven around the block in my friend's new automobile, subject to his 
choices of direction and speed. Nevertheless, the house that I see recurringly as we 
circle about – however subject my viewing may be to his choices – remains my 
house and not someone else's. 
 
You and I enter a room, walk on opposite sides from the back to the front and then 
glance at a portrait on the wall before us. You are wearing thick glasses, I none. 
Nevertheless, we see the same portrait. We have no difficulty whatsoever, that is, 
in identifying the portrait that we see despite our viewings of it having been 
conditioned by choices and objects unique to each of us. 
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Once again, we needn't multiply counterexamples to reconfirm the invalidity of the 
arguments. Perhaps, however, we should ponder briefly the general form of the 
argument, namely, that different causes cannot have identical effects, for so many have 
overlooked for so long its transparent invalidity. Any quantum physicist could readily 
provide counterexamples to it (nonidentical events causing identical effects, for 
example, or even identical events causing nonidentical effects), but we needn't rely on 
events of subatomic dimensions for enlightenment. A simple thought-experiment from 
everyday life will again do as well. 
 
Imagine that I were to walk into my office, sit in the chair in the corner and, by glancing 
across the room, see to my surprise the Prime Minister of Canada, drink in hand, 
standing in a garden on a late afternoon, relaxing for moment while seemingly awaiting 
the arrival of others. Were I to report the phenomenon imprecisely to someone in 
authority, suggesting erroneously that I had seen the Prime Minister standing in my 
office, I might well and rightly be shipped off to a mental institution, for my claim could 
never survive the reality testing to which I and others remain committed by our 
encounters with other things in the room and elsewhere. 
 
Suppose, however, I were to correct the report, reassuring others that, although I had 
indeed as I sat in a chair in my office seen the Prime Minister, I had never seen him 
standing in my office but rather standing somewhere in a garden. I might still and rightly 
be incarcerated, for my identity claim has withstood no tests comparable to those to 
which I and others could have submitted objects in the room or elsewhere simply by 
moving among them. 
 
Suppose, however, I were to return to my office a short time later accompanied by 
several observers, every one of whom, when seated in the chair and glancing across the 
room, could see the Prime Minister of Canada standing before the same rose bush in 
the same garden but having now been joined by a small group of advisors. Suppose, 
further, that one of the observers, a close friend of the Prime Minister familiar with the 
residence and garden, were to call the residence while watching and ask to be 
connected to him, only to be told by a voice on the phone that the Prime Minister does 
not wish to be disturbed. Recognising the caller, however, the owner of the voice, 
glancing through a window onto the garden and noting that the meeting is about to 
conclude, begins to describe what the Prime Minister and his visitors are doing – the 
description matching exactly what the observer is seeing of it while seated within my 
office.  
 
My identity claim would now have become of surpassing interest! Whereas it had earlier 
appeared useless, it would now have survived a reproducible test rendering our seeing 
of the Prime Minister a phenomenon, as yet unexplained, suitable for scientific scrutiny. 
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Serious thinkers would now obliged to ascertain testably how in the world it is possible 
for observers to see what the Prime Minister of Canada is doing either by observing him 
from a contiguous place within whatever space he happens to be occupying or by 
entering my office, sitting in the corner chair and glancing across the room? What laws 
govern the diverse causal chains? And so forth. 
 
The moral of the story is obvious: identity claims are epistemologically prior to causal 
attribution. An identity claim, once affirmed, may stimulate causal analysis, and causal 
analysis may compel us to forego an identity claim no longer useful; but causal analysis 
can provide no counterexample to an identity claim. 
  
Until the young girl and I have agreed that the object seen by means of the photograph 
of her grandfather is her grandfather, we can bring no causal evidence to bear on the 
situation. Once we have agreed upon the identity, however, we may then fruitfully ask 
all sorts of questions concerning techniques that the photographer might have used to 
render the identity clearer, more trustworthy, less subject to extraneous information, 
etc.. The lesson can be succinctly summarized.  
 
Identifying must precede causal analysis!  
 
The maxim, if keep resolutely in mind, will immunize one forever from the contagion of 
the fallacies inhering in the Arguments from Diverse Causes.  
 
 
Arguments from Mistaken Identity: 
 
Many authors have suggested, quite correctly, that objects and events seen by means of 
movies or photographs are frequently misidentified. Sometimes this is due to the 
peculiar manner in which some subjects behave when knowingly being photographed, 
rendering atypical the object later seen by means of the film or photograph. (The young 
girl's grandfather, for example, unusually upset by being photographed, may have acted 
so atypically before the camera that unknowledgeable persons may have difficulty 
identifying him with the person seen later by means of his photograph.) 
 
Misidentification is especially common when objects are seen by means of movies or 
television, for objects thus seen are encountered commonly within a context of events 
created by editing, and the point of editing, as every propaganda filmmaker can attest, 
is to reinforce misleading identifications. 
 
The Arguments from Mistaken Identity, therefore, unlike those previously considered, 
deserve careful consideration, for they encompass cautions that are reliable and fruitful. 
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They suggest that accurate identification of the objects seen by means of movies or 
photographs may be difficult, and ought not to be casually assumed. As arguments 
against the possibility of accurate identification, however, they are as fallacious as those 
already considered. Were it indeed impossible for us ever to identify accurately objects 
seen by means of movies or photographs, we could never misidentify them either.  
 
The advocates of such arguments are therefore quite right when pointing toward the 
difficulties of identifying objects accurately when seen by means of movies or 
photographs. Unfortunately, they fail to notice that the situation is no worse than when 
attempting to identify objects seen directly. The difficulties of the latter are so common 
that they are commonly overlooked, but they arise from the same condition – lack of 
adequate information – that provokes us to misidentify objects encountered by means 
of movies or photographs; and the same means are available to the photographer or 
filmmaker to overcome the difficulties as are available to us when trying to avoid 
misidentifying objects in our ordinary encounters with them – provision of adequate 
information. With care we may provide information that is sufficiently accurate to get 
about the asymptotic business of identification.  
 
Imagine, for example, that I am walking down a corridor. As I pass quickly by an 
open doorway, I catch a glimpse of what appears to be a robbery in progress. Am 
I right in my identification? I shouldn't be too confident, for my glimpse was too 
short. 
 
Suppose, however, that I had stopped in the doorway and watched the 
proceedings for ten seconds or so. Would I then be right in my conjecture? My 
confidence would increase, for I have more information to rely upon. But I could 
still be wrong. 
 
What, then, if I were to have paused in the doorway unseen for one minute. 
Would I then be right in my identification of the event underway? Again, my 
confidence would increase with more information; but again I could be wrong. 
 
Suppose, instead, I were to have watched the proceedings for fifteen minutes. 
Could I then automatically assume that my judgement was correct? I would have 
much more information against which to test it, but I could still be wrong. 
(Perhaps the people are professionals hired to test a security system; perhaps 
they are actors in a complex practical joke at my expense; etc.)  
 
The moral again is clear: identifications of objects and events encountered in "real life" 
are tentative judgements subject to continual testing and frequent refutation. We must 
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bring every bit of relevant evidence to bear. The more evidence we have, the better the 
judgement, and, when all is said and done, we can still be wrong. 
 
The situation is no worse when seeing objects by means of movies or photographs. 
Often, indeed, we are better off when seeing events by means of movies or 
photographs, for filmmakers and photographers have techniques available to them for 
facilitating the process of identification. (Remember the slow-motion film being used by 
the scientist, as noted above.) The techniques are never foolproof and unscrupulous 
filmmakers and photographers may work hard to deceive us by mimicking them, but 
that is simply a part of the evidence that we must accumulate to play the identification 
game more accurately.  
 
Propaganda movies, for example, and most feature films that for shared reasons employ 
propagandistic cutting techniques consist generally of sequences of short takes. Why? 
For the same reason that short glimpses are untrustworthy in everyday life, as noted 
above. Filmmakers can choose, however, to lengthening their takes, providing viewers 
with more information within which to measure the identity and credibility of the 
events seen, paralleling exactly the epistemological situation noted above in everyday 
life.   
 
An object seen for only five second by means of a movie may easily be 
misidentified. 
 
An object seen for thirty seconds may be misidentified but less easily.  
 
An object seen for five minutes within a reasonably transparent context will 
seldom be misidentified, (given a reasonably transparent context).   
 
And, as I write a century after the first movie appeared, even God would 
find it difficult to fake a thirty minute take (but God, of course, contrary to 
the presumption of a good many directors, has always preferred to create 
rather than direct!). 
 
As every 'cinema direct' or 'cinema verité' filmmaker has known, therefore, long takes 
preclude cutting and hence reinforce a viewer's ability to identify accurately the objects 
and events seen by means of the film. Could the viewer still be misled? Yes, but only 
with greater difficulty, for by foregoing the technique most calculated to mislead (i.e., 
rapid cutting), the 'verité' documentarists provide the viewer with yet another piece of 
evidence upon which to secure accurate identifications.  
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Arguments from Mistaken Identity, therefore, are enlightening. They fail, however, to 
preclude the possibility of seeing objects in the world by means of movies or 
photographs. Carefully considered, indeed, they reaffirm it.  
 
Our young girl has brought to bear every piece of evidence she possesses when 
identifying the object seen by means of the photograph of her grandfather with her 
grandfather. Could she be wrong in her identification? Surely, but she has played the 
right game rightly, and none of the counterarguments need impress her. They are 
invalid one and all. 
 
 
 The Impotence of Counterarguments 
 
Our young girl's argument has easily withstood the careless counters of critics. This 
would be small comfort, however, were she to remain fearful of counterarguments yet 
to be constructed. Need she worry? No, strangely enough, for her contention rests upon 
an identity claim, a conjecture having a unique epistemological status; for  
 
Identity claims are irrefutable. 
 
An identity claim may prove to be less useful than a counter claim and hence less worthy 
of maintenance, but it is immune logically from counterexamples. Let's see why. 
 
Imagine, for a moment, that a pen lies on my desk ten centimetres from the upper left 
corner. The pen weighs five grams, is black with silver trim and would break if dropped. 
Imagine, as well, that a book rests on my desk thirty centimetres from the upper left 
corner. The book weighs five-hundred grams, has a red cover and could well survive a 
casual fall.  
 
I now ask you a strange and peculiar question, so strange and peculiar, indeed, that I 
know of no comparable query in the entire history of philosophy; namely is the pen 
identical to the book?15 
                                                     
15 I assume here that by 'A is identical to B' we mean exactly what Leibniz would have 
meant, namely that were one to speak truly of A, one would thereby speak truly of B, and 
conversely. One ought not to confuse this interesting claim with the trivial one suggesting that 
we think of a compound object consisting of the pen and the book as parts. The claim being 
considered here is not that the pen and the book are parts of a compound object, but rather 
that they are one and the same object. Many philosophers, assuming the non-identity of two 
objects, have inquired into the necessary and sufficient conditions of their 'individuation', etc.. 
No one, to my knowledge, has ever queried the possible identity of objects presumed to be 
distinct. 
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I presume, of course, that you and I believe the pen and the book to be distinct, and 
have no reason whatsoever to believe otherwise. But what if someone were to claim 
otherwise? What counterevidence could we bring against the claim? 
 
Suppose someone were to enter my room and, in the course of conversation, assert 
that the pen is identical to the book. (I have no idea what reasons she might have for 
believing the pen and the book to be identical, and hence shall not contest the issue 
here. Let's imagine that she has her reasons, and caution ourselves to remember that, 
prior to the advent of quantum theory, no one had any reason to believe that a nuclear 
particle could be in two places at once, either, though that is now a compelling 
explanation for most variants of the classical two-slit experiment.) 
 
What evidence could I bring against her claim? If I were to say to her, "But the pen 
weighs five grams while the book weighs five-hundred grams", she would reply "True 
enough, it weighs both five grams and five-hundred grams." Were I to retort, "But surely 
an object cannot weigh both five grams and five-hundred grams!", she would simply 
point to the pen/book (whichever, or both, from my viewpoint) and say: "But there's a 
counterexample!" 
 
Note my dilemma! Whenever I attempt to point out a difference between the pen and 
the book, she accepts the distinction but construes it adverbially rather than adjectivally, 
retaining the identity. Every time I propose an empirical test, she agrees to the test (for 
example, the pen/book weighs five grams and five-hundred grams but apparently not 
three-hundred-and-fifty), but then simply attributes the bifurcation to a difference in 
measuring technique rather than to a difference in substance. (In one case we are 
measuring the object "in a pen-like way", in the other "in a book-like way"; the former 
yields five grams, the latter five-hundred) 
 
Put another way, whenever I suggest that some unnegated predicate (whether 
relational or otherwise) is testably true of either the pen or the book, she agrees with 
me. Whenever I go on to suggest, however, that the predicate entails the negation of 
some other predicate, she refuses to accept the entailment, pointing out that I am 
thereby simply and obviously begging the question of the identity of the pen and the 
book.16 I can bring no counterevidence against her identity claim without – from her 
perspective – begging the question! 
                                                     
16 The difference between her holding to the identity, come what may, and holding to 
the truth of a testable assertion, come what may, is crucial. In the later instance she would have 
to deny some testable fact that I assert or presume some unknown fact to be testably true that I 
do not know to be true. But in this instance she denies no testable fact (indeed she agrees with 
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Clearly, I am trapped with no escape, and since the situation that we have been 
discussing is generalizable, the consequences are staggering. It is a scandalous, I 
suggest, that so few philosophers have heretofore registered the peculiar 
epistemological status of identity claims, a status that should have been evident since at 
least the time of Kant. Identify claims are immune to empirical refutation, for anyone, if 
logically careful, may take any A to be identical to any B without fear of empirical 
counterevidence, for no counterevidence can be brought to bear without begging the 
question. 
 
The consequences for thinking in general, and for thinking about film and photography 
in particular, are fascinating and profound. Let me conclude this chapter with some 
remarks about the latter, before devoting Chapter 2 to the former. 
 
 
  Consequences for the Theory of Filmmaking 
 
"Only Kodak tells it like it was." 
 
Advertising slogan for the still-
photographic division of Eastman Kodak 
Company, 1991. 
 
 
Early in this essay I noted that commentators on film have been obsessed since the 
19th-century with an ontological issue, namely, when one encounters an event by 
means of a movie or photograph, what kind of event does is one encountering? A 
representation, an image, a picture, a depiction, a reproduction, a model, a signifier, an 
imaginary signifier, ...? 
 
This entire critical tradition, I suggest, has been based upon a misunderstanding of the 
logic of identity claims. How one answers the above question makes no difference 
whatsoever to theorizing fruitfully about filmmaking. What is important is the answer 
one gives to a radically different question, namely,  
 
When one encounters an event by means of movie or photography, 
what is one seeing? 
 
                                                     
the result of every test I propose) and asserts no testable fact to be true that I deny. Her identity 
claim is therefore methodologically sound, unlike conventionalist claims. 
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The answer, given the flexibility that identity claims require, is 'that depends'! There can 
be no generally true yet nontrivial answer, for one must examine each cinematic or 
photographic event case by case, bring all the evidence at one's disposal to bear and 
then make a judgement based on the evidence. 
 
When viewing 'cinema direct' movies, for example, one is quite likely to judge accurately 
that one is seeing an event identifiable with an event that occurred elsewhere in the 
world on a previous occasion. To deny this claim would, in most instances, render 
unintelligible the decisions made by the filmmakers in its presentation and permit no 
explanation of the persistence of the techniques unique to their documentary domain.  
We now live in a world, unlike the world of my great-grandparents, within which it is 
possible to enter a room in Toronto, thread-up a projector or turn on a digital replay 
unit and encounter thereby an event that occurred in a high school in Philadelphia in the 
late 1960s. Within a room in Toronto we may now by use of suitable machines witness 
an event that we can identify – and indeed ought to identify – with an event that a 
'cinema verité' filmmaker encountered in the late 1960s in Philadelphia. 
 
In the case of narrative movies, on the other hand, the issue is complex - much more so, 
indeed, than the issue of how we identify events in the everyday world. Unless great 
care is taken, thinkers will misrepresent both the richness and the complexity of a 
viewer's responses to them. 
 
Imagine, for example, that I were to project for myself a print of HIGH NOON. What 
would I see? Would I see Sheriff Kane walking down the main street of a western 
town looking for help? or would I see Gary Cooper walking down a street on a 
backlot in Hollywood?  
 
The answer to both questions is 'Yes', and one will misconstrue the scope and limits 
of film theory unless one remains open to the evidence in favour of them all. 
 
But the bottom logical line is transparent:  
 
One encounters events by means of movies and photographs, and sometimes 
those events enable one to see events that can justifiably be identified with 
events otherwise encounterable in the world.  
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The conventionality of identity, pragmatically construed, reorders the tasks of film 
theorists, aligning them with theoretical inquiries in other disciplines. The living 
questions now become: 
  
What have movies enabled us to see?  
What can movies enable us to see? and (perhaps most difficult of all)  
What ought movies to enable us to see?  
 
These are admittedly tough questions, but they are at least empirically approachable, 
unlike the pervasive and fruitless ontological queries of the past one-hundred years that 
appear nowhere on the list. 
 
